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External Shocks and the HIPC Initiative: 










After providing a brief background on recent developments of terms of trade shocks and 
debt  relief  initiatives,  the  paper  uses  a  simple  macroeconomic  model  to  estimate  the 
impact  of  debt  relief  and  terms  of  trade  shocks  on  growth  and  poverty  in  African 
countries. For the 18 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) that reached the enhanced 
HIPC  decision  point  by  end-December  2000,  the  basic  quantitative  findings  are  as 
follows: 
·  HIPC debt relief has boosted economic growth in these countries by an average of 
2.9 percent per annum (everything else remaining the same). 
·  The computed result of this increase in growth is a reduction in poverty by an 
average of 2.2 percent per annum. 
·  However, recent deteriorations in the terms of trade might have counter-balanced 
these positive effects by lowering growth by an average of 2.0 percent per annum 
and by increasing poverty by an average of 1.3 percent per annum. 
·  Clearly, much of the positive impact emanating from the HIPC Initiative has been 
eroded  due  to  recent  deteriorations  in  the  terms  of  trade.  The  HIPC-induced 
growth and poverty reduction have been reduced each to an average of 0.9 percent 
per annum. 
The paper also estimates the net effect on growth and poverty of the recently agreed 100 
percent multilateral debt relief. This is predicted to boost economic growth by an average 
of 5 percent per annum and reduce poverty by about 5.3 percent per annum for the group 
of all African HIPCs. The paper concludes that 100 percent debt relief is crucial for 
Africa, but that more aid and policies need to be focused on a long-term development 
strategy that fosters the necessary structural transformation. 
 
 
                                                 
* Respectively, Manager (m.hussain@afdb.org), and Senior Research Economist (b.gunter@afdb.org); 
Research Division; Development Research Department (PDRE); African Development Bank, Temporary 
Relocation, 1002 Tunis-Belvedere, Tunisia. The views and interpretations in this paper are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily represent those of the African Development Bank. We would like to thank 
Audrey Verdier-Chouchane for providing useful comments and Koua Louis Kouakou for collecting some 
of the data and performing some initial calculations. Comments are most welcome.   iv 
 
 
External Shocks and the HIPC Initiative: 









Après une brève présentation de l’évolution récente des chocs des termes de l’échange et 
des initiatives d’allègement de la dette, le document utilise un modèle macroéconomique 
simple  pour  évaluer  l’impact  des  chocs  de  l’allègement  de  la  dette  et  des  termes  de 
l’échange  sur  la  croissance  et  la  pauvreté  dans  les  pays  africains.  Pour  les  18  pays 
pauvres très endettés (PPTE) qui ont atteint le point de décision de l’initiative PPTE 
renforcée à la fin de décembre 2000, les constatations quantitatives fondamentales sont 
les suivantes : 
·  L’allègement  de  la  dette  au  titre  de  l’initiative  PPTE  a  favorisé  la  croissance 
économique de ces pays de 2,9 pour cent environ par an (toute chose égale par 
ailleurs). 
·  Les résultats calculés de cette hausse de la croissance représentent une réduction 
de la pauvreté de 2,2 pour cent environ par an. 
·  Toutefois,  les  récentes  détériorations  des  termes  de  l’échange  auraient  pu 
contrebalancer ces effets positifs en réduisant la croissance de 2 pour cent environ 
par an et en accroissant la pauvreté de 1,3 pour cent par an. 
·  Clairement, une grande partie de l’impact positif découlant de l’initiative PPTE a 
été  érodée  en  raison  des  récentes  détériorations  des  termes  de  l’échange.  La 
croissance et la réduction de la pauvreté induites par l’initiative PPTE ont été 
chacune réduites à environ 0,9 pour cent par an. 
Le document estime également l’effet net sur la croissance et la pauvreté de l’allègement 
de la dette multilatérale de 100 pour cent convenu récemment. Cela devra normalement 
favoriser une hausse de la croissance économique de 5 pour cent par an et une réduction 
de  la  pauvreté  de  5,3  pour  cent  par  an  pour  le  groupe  de  pays  africains  PPTE.  Le 
document  conclut  qu’un  allègement  de  la  dette  de  100  pour  cent  est  crucial  pour 
l’Afrique, mais que l’aide et les politiques devront, pour la plupart, être axées davantage 
sur une stratégie à long terme contribuant à la transformation structurelle nécessaire. 
 
                                                 
* Respectively, Manager (m.hussain@afdb.org), and Senior Research Economist (b.gunter@afdb.org); 
Research Division; Development Research Department (PDRE); African Development Bank, Temporary 
Relocation, 1002 Tunis-Belvedere, Tunisia. The views and interpretations in this paper are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily represent those of the African Development Bank. We would like to thank 
Audrey Verdier-Chouchane for providing useful comments and Koua Louis Kouakou for collecting some 
of the data and performing some initial calculations. Comments are most welcome.   1 
 
 
Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Crude oil prices have increased from about $12 per barrel in 1999, to above $50 
per barrel in 2004, and even reached $60 in June 2005, exacerbating already serious 
poverty in most oil-importing African countries. Fortunately, some export commodity 
prices of oil-importing African countries (like for example, coffee) have also recovered in 
2003 and 2004, counter-balancing the negative impact of increases in oil prices. Yet, 
given the high degree of import and export concentrations in all poor African countries, 
import  and  export  price  volatilities  continue  to  have  significant  negative  impacts  on 
growth in these countries. Interestingly, little empirical work exists on the systematic 
quantification of the impact of these external shocks on African countries. 
 
Another lack of quantitative analysis relates to the impact of debt service provided 
under  the  Heavily  Indebted  Poor  Country  (HIPC)  Initiative  on  growth  and  poverty. 
Building on the debt overhang theory as it emerged from the seminal contributions of 
Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1989), there have been many empirical studies confirming 
the existence of a debt overhang in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). While 
there is broad agreement that all HIPCs faced a debt overhang before receiving HIPC 
debt relief, there is some disagreement on the relevance of a debt overhang for HIPCs 
that have reached the HIPC completion point. Most of the current proposals for further 
debt relief are based on the shortage in financing these countries continue to face to reach 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, no use has been made thus far of 
a relative simple model to systematically estimate the impact of debt service and debt 
relief on growth and poverty.  
 
The model used in this paper provides a convenient methodology not only to 
estimate the impact of debt service on growth and poverty, but also to estimate the impact 
of external shocks on growth and poverty. Hence, this paper will measure separately (a) 
the macroeconomic impact of the HIPC Initiative on growth and poverty reduction, and 
(b) the extent to which these positive impacts emanating from the HIPC Initiative have 
been counter-balanced by recent deteriorations in the terms of trade (ToT). Furthermore, 
the methodology also allows us to estimate the net effect of the multilateral debt relief 
agreed by the Finance Ministers of the Intergovernmental Group of Eight (G8) in June 
2005 for HIPCs that have reached the HIPC completion point. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Following this introduction, the next chapter 
provides a brief background on the commodity risk vulnerability of African HIPCs and 
the  HIPC  Initiative.  The  third  chapter  outlines  the  methodology  by  summarizing  the 
model used, explaining how the model’s framework can be used to provide country-
specific quantitative measures for the impact of debt relief on growth and poverty, and 
explaining how the model allows us to provide country-specific quantitative measures for 
the impact of changes in the ToT on growth and poverty. The fourth chapter reports and 
interprets the results for the 18 African HIPCs that have reached their enhanced HIPC 
decision points by end-December 2000. A fifth chapter suggests some policy implications 
and conclusions. 
   2 
 
 
Chapter II: External Shocks and HIPC Debt Relief in Africa 
 
Given  the  various  contributions  linking  Africa’s  indebtedness  to  Africa’s 
structural deficits we limit this chapter to a summary of issues that are directly relevant 
for our analysis.
1 The first section summarizes the key issues related to the commodity 
risk vulnerability of African HIPCs, the second section describes and summarizes the 
HIPC Initiative, the third section summarizes the developments on debt relief since the 
adoption of the enhanced HIPC Initiative, before the fourth section provides a summary 
of the key issues of the linkage between debt and development in Africa. 
 
II.1  Commodity Risk Vulnerability of African HIPCs 
As  the  International  Task  Force  on  Commodity  Risk  Management  (2002)  has 
pointed  out,  HIPCs  depend  on  primary  commodities  for  more  than  half  of  their 
merchandise export earnings. About half of the HIPCs generate more than 90 percent of 
their merchandise export revenues from a few commodities such as cocoa and coffee. 
They are, in the order of dependence on commodities, Mauritania, Chad, São Tomé & 
Príncipe,  Angola,  Rwanda,  Niger,  Congo  Republic,  Sudan,  Guinea-Bissau,  Burundi, 
Somalia, Benin, Ghana, and Cameroon. On average, the commodity share in the total 
merchandise  exports  stands  at  around  84  percent  for  HIPCs,  compared  to  about  55 
percent for developing countries as a whole. For example, in Uganda, about 5 million 
smallholders and poor households—a quarter of the population—earn their living from 
producing coffee. 
 
Many African HIPCs are major exporters of commodities, important for industrial 
production and domestic consumption in the developed world. About 60 percent of cocoa 
in the world is produced in three African HIPCs: Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana. 
HIPCs  produce  and  export  about  20  percent  of  coffee  in  the  world.  Prices  of  these 
commodities are particularly volatile. For instance, between 1983 and 1997, cocoa prices 
fluctuated between 60 percent and 170 percent of the average price over this period, and 
robusta  coffee  from  40  percent  to  195  percent—as  against  other  commodity  price 
fluctuations from 50 percent to 150 percent over the same period. In addition, many 
HIPCs are net importers of food and/or fuels. For many African HIPCs, such imports 
represent more than 20 percent of their merchandise imports.  
 
In addition to the high concentration of exports and imports, which imply a high 
vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations, the ToT of African HIPCs have overall 
deteriorated over time, and are expected to deteriorate further, see Figure 1, covering the 
period  of  1990-2005.  Declining  ToT  and  the  high  vulnerability  to  commodity  price 
fluctuations had and continues to have significant implications for growth, poverty, and 
debt sustainability of African HIPCs. Dependence on commodities coupled with high 
volatility of prices results in significant fluctuations in export earnings in HIPCs and 
                                                 
1 Some of the most recent studies, which also provide comprehensive reviews of the HIPC Initiative, are 
Birdsall and Williamson (2002) Geda (2002), Gunter (2003), and especially UNCTAD (2004). Some of 
more specific and recent literature related to commodity risk vulnerability are Barghouti, Kane, Sorby, and 
Mubarik  (2004),  Birdsall  and  Hamoudi  (2002),  Broda  and  Tille  (2003),  Collier  (2002)  Combes  and 
Guillaumont (2002), and Hussain (2005).   3 
 
 
therefore in debt indicators. For instance, Uganda's export revenues are highly correlated 
to  coffee  prices.  Taking  the  level  of  Uganda's  export  earnings  in  1985  as  100,  this 
benchmark fell to 47 in 1993, following a sharp fall in coffee prices, and rose to 170 in 
1997 after prices rallied. Such changes have direct impacts on debt indicators and on 






















Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2005 
 
II.2.  The HIPC Initiative in the African Context 
Since the early 1980s, more and more African countries were unable to pay their 
scheduled  debt  service  and  were  thus  repeatedly  allowed  to  reschedule  their  official 
bilateral debts at increasingly concessional terms during the late 1980s and the early- and 
mid-1990s. During the same time, theoretical and empirical work gave evidence to the 
existence  of  a  debt  overhang  that  could  not  be  resolved  without  a  reduction  of  a 
staggering multilateral debt, as most African countries accumulated it, mostly in the late 
1980s  and  early  1990s.  Based  on  these  developments  and  the  continuous  failure  of 
traditional  debt  relief  to  end  the  repeated  process  of  bilateral  debt  rescheduling,  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank adopted the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative in fall 1996. The key goal of the HIPC Initiative has been 
to reduce all public and publicly guaranteed external debt to a level that would allow 
HIPCs to permanently exit the process of repeated debt rescheduling.
3   
 
                                                 
2 See International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management (2002) for further details. 
3 See World Bank (2003), where referring to the original HIPC concept paper of August 1996: The HIPC 
Debt Initiative—Elaboration of Key Features and Possible Procedural Steps, the explicitly stated goal of 
the Initiative was “to achieve a sustainable debt situation”. 
Figure 1: Terms of Trade of African HIPCs 
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Three years after launching the HIPC Initiative, it was clear that the original HIPC 
framework (HIPC-1) was not sufficient to provide HIPCs with a permanent exit from 
repeated debt rescheduling, and partly due to public pressure, the IMF and World Bank 
formally agreed in September 1999 to enhance the HIPC framework (HIPC-2). Like with 
HIPC-1, HIPC-2 involves two stages. The first stage is a three-year period during which a 
HIPC works in coordination with the support of the World Bank and the IMF to establish 
a record of good economic policies. At the end of this three-year period the IMF and 
World Bank determine whether a country's debt level is sustainable.  For those countries 
whose  debt  burden  remains  unsustainable  after  full  use  of  traditional  debt  relief 
mechanisms,  a  package  of  debt  relief  is  identified.    This  is  known  as  the  enhanced 
Decision Point (eDP), at which some creditors may start with the provision of HIPC debt 
relief. The decision to provide HIPC debt relief irrevocably is taken once the conditions 
identified at the eDP are satisfied, which is then known as the enhanced Completion 
Point. 
 
HIPC-2 assumes that a country’s external debt is sustainable if the net present 
value (NPV) debt-to-export ratio (which is called the export criterion) is around 150 
percent (lowered from the 200-250 percentage range under HIPC-1). Unlike in HIPC-1, 
which took external vulnerability issues into account when determining the sustainable 
NPV debt-to-export ratio for a specific country, the enhanced framework targets a unique 
NPV debt to export ratio of 150 percent at the eDP, with the justification to simplify the 




The amount of debt relief is determined in NPV terms such that the NPV debt-to-
export ratio would be 150 percent at the eDP. The actual ratios of the years following the 
eDP may be quite different.
5 Hence, the enhanced framework was clarified in September 
2001 to allow a so-called "topping-up" of debt relief at the completion point, if the 150 
percent NPV debt to export target ratio has been eroded significantly due to exogenous 
shocks, though additional bilateral debt relief beyond what is required under the HIPC 
Initiative is taken into account.
6 As of end-April 2005, HIPC debt relief had been topped-
up for Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Niger, and Rwanda. Four African completion point HIPCs 
(Mauritania, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda) did not benefit from any topping up 
because  they  reached  their  completion  points  before  the  policy  for  topping  up  was 
implemented. There is no possibility to top-up HIPC debt relief once a HIPC has reached 
                                                 
4 As under HIPC-1, HIPC-2 considers the provision of debt relief under a fiscal window, as long as a 
country has both (a) an export-to-GDP ratio of at least 30 percent (lowered from 40 percent under HIPC-1) 
and (b) a government revenue-to-GDP ratio of at least 15 percent (lowered from 20 percent under HIPC-1), 
whereby it is assumed that a country’s debt is sustainable if the NPV debt-to-government revenue ratio is 
around 250 percent (lowered from 280 percent under HIPC-1). Out of the 23 African HIPCs that have 
reached  the  enhanced  decision  point  by  end-April  2005,  only  Ghana,  Mauritania,  and  Senegal  have 
qualified under the fiscal window. 
5 For example, it was expected at Rwanda’s enhanced decision point, that the NPV debt-to-export ratio at 
end-2003 would be 193 percent. However, based on the analysis at the Completion Point in April 2004, it 
turned out to be 326 percent. 
6 The additional bilateral debt relief, beyond of what is required to be provided under the HIPC Initiative, is 
based on some industrialized countries’ promise to provide 100 percent bilateral debt relief following the 
enhanced completion point.   5 
 
 
its completion point, even though external factors may result in debt ratios far above the 
150 percent target, as is most clearly the case for Uganda. The remaining six African 
completion point countries (Benin, Ghana, Mali, Madagascar, Senegal, and Zambia) did 
not meet the conditions for topping-up as additional bilateral debt relief was expected to 
keep the projected debt ratio below the target ratio.  
 
Table 1 provides the details on the classification of African countries with regards 
to the HIPC Initiative, the eDP dates, the NPV debt and debt reductions, as well as data 
on six key debt ratios. While the averages
7 of the various groups reflect the degree of 
indebtedness of these groups, the country-specific details provided in the Table show that 
there are considerable differences across countries, even within a specific group. 
               
The HIPC framework does not determine how the various creditors provide their HIPC 
debt relief; it just determines the NPV debt reductions. NPV debt reductions have been provided 
through  reductions  and  cancellation  of  debt  service  (the  later  especially  once  the  enhanced 
Completion Point has been reached) and through the rescheduling of debt service (which even 
though it provides only a temporary reduction in debt service payments, it implies generally a 
NPV debt reduction). The cumulative reduction in nominal debt service to be provided under the 
enhanced HIPC Initiative (mostly over about 20 years) to the 23 African HIPCs that have reached 
the eDP by April 2005, is estimated to amount to nearly US$45 billion, of which an estimated 
US$8.2 have been provided until the end of 2004. Figure 2 shows the debt service payments of 




















  Source: Authors’ estimates based on April 2005 HIPC Progress Report and HIPC-1 
Completion Point documents for Mozambique and Uganda. 
                                                 
7 Averages provided in all Tables are weighted by the purchasing power parity (PPP) based GDP. 
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I.  HIPCs (that reached the enhanced DP by Dec. 2000)
BENIN Jul 2000 808 265 34 2 131 10 209 15
BURKINA FASO Jul 2000 676 553 22 2 194 14 193 14
CAMEROON Oct 2000 5,463 1,260 58 5 193 16 298 25
GAMBIA, THE Dec 2000 262 67 67 4 97 7 431 28
GUINEA Dec 2000 1,803 545 51 4 197 16 469 37
GUINEA-BISSAU Dec 2000 510 416 231 10 781 33 1,390 58
MADAGASCAR Dec 2000 2,311 836 48 2 179 8 451 20
MALAWI Dec 2000 1,551 643 77 3 273 9 416 14
MALI Sep 2000 1,443 539 53 3 144 9 304 19
MAURITANIA Feb 2000 1,625 622 131 8 324 20 573 34
MOZAMBIQUE Apr 2000 1,446 2,023 30 2 115 9 224 17
NIGER Dec 2000 1,080 664 45 1 268 8 495 15
RWANDA Dec 2000 664 695 35 1 432 16 348 13
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE Dec 2000 101 97 236 11 596 27 967 43
SENEGAL Jun 2000 2,344 488 51 5 150 13 281 25
TANZANIA Apr 2000 1,485 2,026 16 2 102 11 148 16
UGANDA Feb 2000 1,077 1,003 19 1 108 6 175 10
ZAMBIA Dec 2000 4,079 2,499 126 6 395 20 626 31
Sum of NPV Debt / Average of Ratios 28,727 15,241 46 3 185 12 318 21
II.   HIPCs (that reached enhanced DP by April 2004)
CHAD May 2001 635 170 39 2 222 9 537 22
CONGO, DEM. REP. OF Jul 2003 10,890 6,311 219 6 980 30 3,455 76
ETHIOPIA Nov 2001 2,805 1,982 48 2 303 14 270 12
GHANA Feb 2002 3,886 2,186 66 5 155 13 401 35
SIERRA LEONE Mar 2002 862 600 119 8 872 60 1,025 70
Sum of NPV Debt / Average of Ratios 19,078 11,249 95 4 372 17 694 32
III.    HIPCs (that have not yet reached enhanced DP)
BURUNDI 670 98 3 1,472 48 499 16
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. 559 62 1 570 9 576 10
COMOROS 167 81 1 528 10 606 10
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 4,600 229 3 188 2 544 6
COTE D IVOIRE 11,159 345 (orig.) 99 8 212 17 560 44
LIBERIA 1,971 477 0 1,445 1 n.a. n.a.
SOMALIA 2,304 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SUDAN 14,920 133 0 575 2 1,027 3
TOGO 1,018 83 2 210 5 593 14
Sum of NPV Debt / Average of Ratios 37,367 135 4 341 9 799 21
IV.    Other African countries
ALGERIA 24,366 45 9 114 22 113 22
ANGOLA (sustainable HIPC) 9,064 133 20 121 18 218 31
BOTSWANA 352 7 1 11 2 16 3
CAPE VERDE 210 41 3 91 7 195 14
DJIBOUTI 177 33 2 85 5 n.a. n.a.
EGYPT 24,897 26 2 124 9 133 10
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 200 52 1 6 0 64 2
ERITREA 178 31 1 158 4 132 4
GABON 3,826 89 10 108 12 316 36
KENYA (sustainable HIPC) 4,761 42 5 150 16 188 20
LESOTHO 460 41 6 78 12 135 21
LIBYA n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
MAURITIUS 1,653 37 7 58 11 199 36
MOROCCO 15,545 46 9 110 21 181 34
NAMIBIA n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
NIGERIA 31,116 84 5 144 9 163 10
SEYCHELLES 206 39 2 43 3 97 6
SOUTH AFRICA 24,168 20 4 64 11 87 16
SWAZILAND 285 22 2 24 2 90 8
TUNISIA 10,556 57 8 110 15 219 30
ZIMBABWE 3,716 62 4 184 10 184 11
Sum of NPV Debt / Average of Ratios 155,738 38 5 101 13 136 17
AFRICA (Sum / Average) 240,910 26,490 47 5 129 13 182 18
Table 1: Net Present Value (NPV) Debt, HIPC Debt Reduction, and Key 










2000-2002 averages  7 
 
 
Given that the HIPC framework requires that eligible HIPCs adopt a poverty reduction 
strategy, an implicit condition for HIPC debt relief has been that debt service savings due to the 
HIPC Initiative are spent on pro-poor social sectors spending, mostly targeting primary education 
and health services for the poor. This increase in social sector spending is expected to reduce 
poverty and to stimulate growth, at least in the long-term, though critics have pointed out that a 
much broader development strategy is needed to reduce poverty and to stimulate growth in a 
more  sustainable  way,  including  the  elimination  of  current  structural  problems  that  have 
contributed to Africa’s high indebtedness.  
 
II.3.  Developments Since the Adoption of HIPC-2 
The period since the adoption of the enhanced framework has been characterized 
by three major developments. First, evidence has been mounting that even HIPC-2 is 
insufficient to provide any reasonably defined debt sustainability. Hence, in April 2001, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Development Association 
(IDA) issued a joint paper (IMF and IDA, 2001) that recognized for the first time that the 
HIPC Initiative might not achieve long-term debt sustainability. The paper acknowledged 
explicitly that the NPV debt-to-export ratio was projected to remain above 150 percent 
for 10 years or more for at least 2 African HIPCs (Malawi and Niger). Recognizing that 
many  HIPCs  might  not  have  achieved  debt  sustainability  after  having  reached  the 
enhanced HIPC completion point, the IMF and World Bank have started to shift the task 
of  achieving  debt  sustainability  away  from  the  HIPC  Initiative  towards  the  Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) framework, “within which the authorities should seek 
to  maintain  a  sustainable  debt  burden.”  Furthermore,  the  adjusted  goal  of  the  HIPC 
Initiative was cemented in a new language, stating that “the HIPC Initiative is designed to 
deal with (…) the existing stock of debt (…) at a given point in time” and “debt relief 




Second,  in  spring  2005,  the  IMF  and  World  Bank  implemented  a  new  debt 
sustainability  framework  for  low-income  countries,  which  seeks  to  ease  the  debt 
sustainability challenge by providing guidance on new lending to low-income countries 
whose main source of financing are official loans. The framework has been developed 
with the intention to better monitor and prevent the accumulation of unsustainable debt 
and  will  guide  IDA  grant  allocation  and  lending  decisions  by  providing  a  more 
systematic  basis  for  analyzing  debt  sustainability  prospects,  including  individual 
countries’ current and prospective ability to service debt. By providing guidance to both 
lenders and borrowers on new lending/borrowing decisions the new framework intends to 
help  low-income  countries  achieve  their  development  objectives  while  maintaining 
sustainable levels of debt (see Box 1 for further details). The African Development Fund 






                                                 
8 See IMF and IDA (2002), pages 32 and 39, respectively.   8 
 
 
Box 1: The IMF and World Bank’s New Debt Sustainability Framework 
The debt sustainability framework is a “forward looking” approach that aims to guide 
borrowing  and  lending  decisions  for  low-income  countries  on  terms  that  allow  borrowing 
countries to devote resources toward achieving the MDGs, while also staying within their means 
to repay loans.  By accounting each country’s specific circumstances, the framework tries to help 
borrowing countries balance their need for funds with their current and prospective ability to 
repay their debts.  Linking a country’s borrowing potential to its current and prospective ability to 
service debt should help countries avoid accumulating excessive debts. 
This approach puts responsibilities on both, borrowers and creditors.  The low-income 
countries  that  seek  new  loans  are  responsible  for  maintaining  debt  sustainability.  They  must 
develop and strengthen policies and institutions that enhance their capacity to manage debt and 
reduce their vulnerability to exogenous shocks ranging from international trading conditions to 
natural disasters.  Among other things, they will need to: keep new borrowing in step with their 
capacity to repay loans, diversify exports, and build up foreign exchange reserves. 
Creditors  and  donors,  for  their  part,  need  to  comprehensively  review  long-term  debt 
projections,  which  incorporate  forward-looking  analysis  and  account  for  possible  shocks.  
Potential creditors and donors should also consider giving additional resources in the form of 
grants and/or highly concessional loans for low-income countries with high levels of debt distress 
to reduce the possibility that these are countries to experience debt distress. Creditors and donors 
also need to explore options that can help limit the potential impacts of adverse exogenous shocks 
or help low-income countries cope with them. 
Source: World Bank, Debt Department, http://www.worldbank.org/  
 
Third,  following  some  disagreement  and  a  long  discussion  within  the  G8  on  a  U.K. 
proposal to also provide 100 percent debt relief on multilateral debt, an agreement has finally 
been reached at the G8 Finance Ministers’ Meeting on June 11-12, 2005.
9 The agreement, which 
applies  to  countries  that  have  reached  their  HIPC  Completion  Point,  recognized  that  HIPC 
Completion Point countries continued to being forced to choose between servicing their debts and 




II.4.  Linking Trade and Development with Debt and Debt Sustainability 
The issues of trade and development are closely associated with the issues of debt 
and  debt  sustainability.  The  accumulation  of Africa’s  debt  reflects  the  fact that  most 
African countries have consistently imported more than they exported (invested more 
than they saved), and hence have borrowed from abroad to bridge their financing gaps. 
The  persistence  of  this  pattern  led  to  accumulation  of  debt  and  to  debt  repayments 
problems.  
 
While the HIPC Initiative has led to marked reduction in Africa’s debt indicators 
in recent years, the pattern of Africa’s trade and its specialization in primary product 
                                                 
9 While the agreement of the G-8 Finance Ministers applies strictly speaking only to three multilateral 
financial institutions, the African Development Fund (ADF), the World Bank’s concessional lending arm 
(IDA), and the IMF, these three institutions amount to about 90 percent of the African HIPCs’ multilateral 
debt. See http://www.g8.gov.uk/ for the detailed statement of the G-8 Finance Ministers. 
10 See Section 9.4 of the Report of the Commission for Africa (2005) and Recommendation 7 of the UN 
Millennium Project (2005) Report for more details.   9 
 
 
exports pose serious conceptual questions to the long-term debt sustainability of African 
HIPCs, largely due to two factors. 
 
First,  there  is  a  threat  of  external  shocks  to  the  sustainability  of  the  HIPC 
initiatives.  Falling  prices  of  primary  exports  have  large  negative  effects  on  external 
indebtedness directly through the transfer of wealth effect and through increasing the 
domestic currency equivalents of such debts, as well as indirectly through increasing debt 
service ratios. A fall in debt service ratios tends to further impose a downward pressure 
on  commodity  prices  when  debtor  countries  attempt  to  export  more  of  the  same 
commodities for meeting debt service obligations without having to cut back imports. 
This effect is stronger the lesser the expenditure of creditor countries, which receive debt 
repayments on the exports of the indebted African countries (see African Development 
Report 2004). The attempt by debtors to export more affects the terms of trade of all 
developing countries to the extent that they export similar commodities. There is also the 
tendency towards currency devaluation, which will also directly lower the terms of trade. 
African countries that depend on primary commodities seem to be caught in a vicious 
circle  where  currency  depreciation  encourages  domestic  supply  of  the  same  primary 
commodities and reduces the prices of primary commodities still further, so that foreign 
exchange  earnings  may  not  improve,  leading  to  further  indebtedness,  pressure  for 
currency depreciation and so on. 
 
A second factor relates to the trade-economic growth nexus. To illustrate this 
factor, it can be argued, in the extreme case, that any poor country can achieve ‘debt 
sustainability’ by curbing its imports, debt repayment, and foreign borrowing to levels 
that  are  compatible  with  its  low  export  earnings.  While  such  a  policy  can  achieve 
‘sustainability’ because it shuts down the sources that raise debt levels, the price of such 
practices would be to condemn the country to even lower growth rates and an increased 
incidence of poverty. Clearly, debt sustainability must be defined in ways that allow 
African  countries  to  realize  their  targeted  development  objectives  by  expanding  their 
investment beyond the limits permitted by their export earnings, i.e., by borrowing from 
abroad. The important point however is that—unlike in the past—this borrowing must be 
used to alter the pattern of trade to generate sufficient foreign exchange earnings for 
future debt repayment.  
  
Looking  specifically  at  the  debt-to-export  indicator,  the  debt  sustainability  of 
HIPCs depends on the change in three basic determinants -- two related to the numerator 
and  one  related  to  the  denominator.  In  the  numerator,  the  first  determinant  is  the 
financing gap, which determines the level of borrowing and the rate of change in the 
stock of debt given the level of export earnings. The financing gap itself depends on a set 
of  important  variables  including  economic  growth  and  social  development  targets, 
investment requirements to achieve those targets and the availability of domestic savings. 
The  second  determinant  in  the  numerator  is  the  level  of  concessionality  of  any  new 
external borrowing. In the denominator there is export growth and there are short-term 
and long-term factors affecting this growth, such as the terms of trade, world demand and 
the diversification of export baskets.  
   10 
 
 
The conceptual challenges facing the issue of debt sustainability as related to the 
nexus of trade, growth and poverty reduction can be summarized as follows:  
·  The  Challenge  of  Development  Targeting.  The  yardstick  for  determining 
sustainability is some arbitrary ratio of debt to exports with no apparent link to 
any quantifiable developmental outcomes, such as achieving a given growth rate 
or socio-economic targets such as the MDGs. In a nutshell, the accumulation of 
foreign indebtedness in the case of many African countries is related partly to the 
structure of their economies and, partly to the manner in which the borrowed 
funds are contracted and utilized. 
·  The  Challenge  of  Graduating  from  Aid  Dependency  to  Self-Sustainability 
and  Private  Sector  Flows.    There  is  no  clear  policy  mechanism  in  HIPC 
arrangements to ensure that poor countries escape from the debt trap. The funds 
released  by  HIPC  programs  are  essentially  used  to  finance  investment  in  the 
social sector, which does not generate foreign exchange earnings directly or in the 
short run. 
   
Chapter III: Methodology 
 
In this paper we attempt to measure the impact of HIPC on growth and poverty 
reduction and show that these might be eroded by deterioration in the terms. We will 
attempt to demonstrate that unless debt relief is used effectively to boost Africa’s exports 
relative to its imports or attract more private capital, the debt problem will re-emerge if 
Africa attempts to grow at rates higher than its balance equilibrium growth rate. The 
methodology used in this paper to assess and compare the impact of debt service savings 
as well as of ToT shocks on real GDP growth rates of HIPCs is based on a variety of 
work  that  all  has  its  theoretical  foundation  on  Thirlwall  (1979).  Thirlwall’s  key 
proposition is that the long run rate of economic growth (y) of any developed country is 
equal to the growth rate of the volume of its exports (E) divided by its income elasticity 
(π) of demand for imports (M), i.e., y = E/π. Though the proposition continues to be 
detailed and elaborated, it has over the years become to be known as Thirlwall’s Law. 
The basic implication of Thirlwall’s Law is that in the long-run, no country can grow 
faster than the rate consistent with the balance of payments equilibrium. 
 
Thirlwall’s Law has then been extended by Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) to be 
applicable  to  developing  countries  (i.e.,  to  include  capital  flows  and  terms  of  trade 
effects), which is also known as the extended Hussain-Thirlwall (H-T) model. While the 
extensions of the H-T model captured the key elements contributing to long-run growth 
in developing countries during most of the 1960s and 1970s, it ignored the impact of debt 
service payments. Following the sharp accumulation of debt during the 1970s and 1980s, 
debt  service  payments  become  more  and  more  a  severe  constraint  for  developing 
countries’ growth. Hence, an extension to the H-T model by Elliott and Rhodd (1999) 
allows taking debt service payments into account. Including this extension to the H-T 
model, the country-specific real GDP growth rate (y) can be measured by the following 
expression:  





























































i) capital letters (C, D, E, M, R, and T) stand for nominal values of variables: 
C  =  total capital inflows, 
D  =   total debt services payments (principal + interest), 
E  =  total exports (goods services and transfer receipts), 
M         =  total imports (goods and services plus transfer payments), 
R  =  total receipts as the sum of total exports plus capital inflows (C), 
T  =   total payments as the sum of total imports plus total debt service; 
 
ii) lower case letters (d, e, k, p, y and z) stand for rates of parameters: 
d          =          rate of change of debt service (D), 
e  =  rate of change in the exchange rate (domestic price of foreign 
currency), 
k  =  rate of growth of capital inflows (C), 
pd  =  rate of change in domestic prices (export prices in domestic 
currency), 
pf  =  rate of change in foreign prices (import prices), 
z  =  rate of growth of world income; 
 
iii) Greek letters (h, y, e, and π) stand for elasticities: 
h  =  price elasticity of demand for exports, 
y    =  price elasticity of demand for imports, 
e  =  income elasticity of demand for exports, and 
π  =   income elasticity of demand for imports. 
 
The  beauty  of  the  model  is  that  it  reflects  the  five  most  crucial  components 
boosting  (or  hindering)  economic  growth  in  developing  countries.  The  first  part 
[T/(Mπ)(E/R  h+M/T  y)(pd-e-pf)]  represents  the  ToT  effect,  the  second  part  [T/(Mπ) 
(E/R) (pd + ez)] represents the domestic price and export effect; the third part -[T/(Mπ) 
(M/T) (pf + e)] represents the devaluation and imported inflation effect; the fourth part -
[T/(Mπ) (D/T) (d + e)] represents the debt service effect; and the fifth part  [T/(Mπ) (C/R) 
k] represents the capital flows effect. The ToT effect and capital flows effect can be 
either positive or negative. The domestic price and export effect are generally positive, 
while the devaluation and imported inflation effect as well as the debt service effect have 
a negative impact (as is already reflected explicitly in the minus sign in front of these 
terms).  
 
While the calculation of the impact of debt service payments and of the ToT is 
straightforward from the first and fourth components of the above growth equation, some 
explanations are needed for the methodology on how to calculate the impact of either   12 
 
 
effect on poverty. It might be possible to extend the model further to derive a formal 
presentation  of  the  impact  each  growth  component  has  on  poverty,  however  for  not 
complicating matters, we use the poverty elasticity of growth
11 to measure the impact of 
debt relief on poverty. The same methodology is adopted for the impact of changes in the 
terms of trade on poverty. In other words, we multiply the poverty elasticity by the effect 
debt service has on growth to get the impact of debt service on poverty. Similarly, we 
multiply the poverty elasticity by the effect the ToT have on growth to get the impact of 
the ToT on poverty.  
 
As Thirlwall’s Law states, no country can grow faster in the long-run than the rate 
consistent with the balance of payments equilibrium, the H-T model has been developed 
to provide estimates for the long-term growth rates of developing countries. The longer 
the time period under consideration, the better the results. This is especially important to 
keep in mind for Africa, where highly volatile capital flows can easily lead to distortions. 
Hence, the model is not supposed to be used for the estimation of short-term growth 
rates, and thus, it would not be appropriate to re-calculate the growth rates for the short 
time period since HIPCs have received enhanced HIPC debt relief. The difference in real 
GDP growth rates before and after the HIPC Initiative is generally also due to many other 
factors. To assume that the change in the real GDP growth rates are all due to HIPC debt 
relief would imply a significant overestimation. Hence, the methodology used to estimate 
the impact of debt service savings is not based on a recalculation of the real GDP growth 
rates (y), but based on the change in country-specific debt service effects due to the new 
D/T ratios and the change in the debt service parameter (d).  
 
Given that we require a minimum of three years following the eDP to make a 
reasonable comparison before and after the HIPC initiative, we have excluded the five 
African HIPCs (Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Ghana, and 
Sierra  Leone)  that  have  reached  the  eDP  after  December  2000.  For  the  two  HIPCs 
(Mozambique and Uganda) that have received HIPC debt service reductions before year 
2000 (based on debt relief provided under HIPC-1), we have added the 1999 HIPC debt 
service savings to the actual debt service payments of 1999 to reflect the situation as it 
would have been if these two countries would not have received any HIPC debt relief in 
1999. This implies that the time for the comparison before and after the HIPC Initiative is 
the same for all 18 African HIPCs that have reached the enhanced decision point by 
December 2000. 
 
The 18 African HIPCs, which have reached the eDP in 2000, have reached the 
eDP in different months, ranging from February to December (see Table 1). Hence, debt 
service and debt service savings for year 2000 are not comparable to each other across 
countries. While a pro-rating based on the eDP month would have been one option to 
make the year 2000 data comparable, there were—at least initially—also differences in 
the time it took to provide enhanced debt relief, and thus, we have decided to always 
exclude year 2000. That is, we have used the period of 1985-1999 for the calculation of 
                                                 
11 The poverty elasticity of growth tells us by how much poverty decreases if real GDP grows by one 
percent. The data for the poverty elasticities have been taken from an internal collection of the African 
Development Bank.   13 
 
 
the GDP growth rate before the HIPC Initiative, and the three-year period of 2001-03 for 
the calculation of the effect from HIPC debt service savings.  
 
Nominal variables (C, D, E, M, R, and T) are always calculated based on the 
specific time period under consideration, i.e., data from 1985-99 has been averaged for 
the  nominal  variables  before  the  HIPC  Initiative,  and  data  from  2001-03  has  been 
averaged for the nominal variables after the HIPC Initiative. However, given that three 
years cannot be considered to be sufficient for the calculation of some parameters and 
elasticities, all elasticities, the exchange rate parameter (e), the capital flow parameter (k), 
and the world income parameter (z) are based on 1985-99 data. The actual change in 
these elasticities and parameters is in any case not that crucial for our purpose, as we are 
interested in the comparison of two effects:  
a)  the impact of changes in debt service (due to the HIPC), which is reflected in 
changes of parameter (d); and 
b)  the impact of ToT shocks (following the enhanced DP), which is reflected in 
changes of parameters pd, and pf.  
 
Hence, we have calculated these three critical parameters (before and after HIPC) 
as follows: 
a)  dbefore HIPC  (the rate of change of debt service before the HIPC Initiative) is based 
on the average annual change in debt service payments from 1985-1999; 
b)  dafter HIPC (the rate of change of debt service after the HIPC Initiative) is based on 
the actual average debt service savings due to the HIPC Initiative for 2001-2003; 
c)  pd before HIPC  and pf before HIPC  (the change in domestic and foreign prices before the 
HIPC  Initiative)  is  based  on  average  annual  changes  in  domestic  and  foreign 
prices from 1985-1999; and 
d)  pd  after  HIPC  and pf  after  HIPC (the change in domestic and foreign prices after the 
HIPC Initiative) are based on the average changes in the ToT during 2001-2003. 
 
 
Chapter IV: Interpretation of Results 
IV.1.  Impact of Debt Service on Growth and Poverty 
The results of the impact of debt service on growth and poverty are provided in 
Table 2.
12 The first column shows the predicted effect of debt service on growth, the 
second column shows the sum of the other four effects of the model on growth. Column 
3, which is the sum of the first two columns, provides the growth rate as predicted by the 
model. The actual real GDP growth rate is provided in the fourth column. The poverty 
elasticity of growth is provided in the fifth column. Finally, the effect of debt service on 
poverty, which is calculated by multiplying the poverty elasticity of growth with the 
predicted GDP growth rate, is then provided in the last column. All results of Table 2 
                                                 
12 Unlike Table 1, which covered 51 of the 53 African countries, we were forced to exclude an additional 
seven countries (see footnote of Table 2) due to lack of sufficient macroeconomic data to calculate 
especially the elasticities.   14 
 
 
show the effects and growth rates per year, though averaged based on 1985-99 data. 
Comparing the predicted growth rate with the actual growth rate average shows that the 
model is overall a good predictor. For the whole of Africa, the model predicted an annual 
growth rate of 2.6 percent, which compares to an actual  growth rate of 2.1 percent. 
 
As expected, the effect of debt service on real GDP growth is negative for all 
countries. The size of the negative impact varies however considerably across countries, 
from a negative 0.2 percent for the Comoros to a negative 11.9 percent for Zimbabwe. 
While the overall average for all HIPCs listed in the first three sections (see aggregation 
on the bottom of Table 2) is (as was expected) lower (-5.0) than for the non-HIPCs (-4.4), 
the table shows that the effect of debt service on growth is—at the country-level—not 
always more prominent for HIPCs than for non-HIPCs. This can partly be contributed to 
the  limited  eligibility  criteria  for  HIPC  debt  relief,  which  is—excluding  a  few  fiscal 
cases—limited to the NPV-debt-to-export ratio. For example, excluding two very highly 
indebted, but not-HIPC-eligible countries (Nigeria and Zimbabwe) from the group of 
non-HIPCs, would result in an average of –3.1 percent for the non-HIPCs. Furthermore, 
comparing the levels of six debt ratios provided in Table 1 with the effect of debt service 
on growth in Table 2, shows an overall remarkable consistency across the four groups. 
There also is an overall consistency between the first and the last columns of Table 2, as 
the group of HIPCs that have reached the eDP by December 2000 has the least negative 
values  for  both  the  effects  of  debt  service  on  growth  and  poverty,  even  though  the 
poverty elasticities vary considerably across countries. The same applies for the other 
three sub-groups.  
 
Concentrating on the last column of Table 2, we finally note that the effect of debt 
service always increases poverty (as the always positive value indicates) and this directly 
follows from the negative impact of debt service on growth. The model predicts that debt 
service increased poverty in Africa by 5.4 percent per annum, with a marginal difference 
between HIPCs (and non-HIPCs. However, as was the case previously, the results vary 
largely across countries, ranging from a less than half a percent (for Chad, the Comoros, 
Gabon,  and  Namibia)  to  more  than  10  percent  (for  Algeria,  Cote  d’Ivoire,  Ghana, 
Nigeria, and Sierra Leone). Looking at such high annual averages, we obviously need to 
keep in mind that the effects reported in the last column of Table 2 are the net predicted 
effects  of  debt  service  on  poverty;  there  obviously  are  many  other  factors  that  have 
contributed to poverty reduction. We are also fully aware that the simple multiplication of 
the effect on growth by the poverty elasticity is obviously not an accurate measure for the 
impact of debt service on poverty. Yet, given that we apply the same methodology when 
we analyze the impact of ToT shocks on poverty, the results are at least indicative and 
comparable. Finally, looking at the relatively low effects of debt service on poverty for 
the first group of HIPCs (averaging 2.8 percent per annum), we need to keep in mind that 
most of these HIPCs receive considerable amounts of traditional debt relief that is not 























Effect of Debt 
Service on 
Poverty
(A) (B) (C = A+B) (D) (E = C*D)
I.  HIPCs (that reached the enhanced DP by Dec. 2000)
BENIN -1.3% 5.2% 3.9% 3.4% -1.12 1.4%
BURKINA FASO -1.9% 9.9% 8.0% 6.0% -0.69 1.3%
CAMEROON -1.6% 0.9% -0.7% 0.5% -0.38 0.6%
GAMBIA, THE -0.8% 1.2% 0.4% 3.8% -0.88 0.7%
GUINEA -7.1% 8.4% 1.3% 4.3% -0.38 2.7%
GUINEA-BISSAU -2.1% 1.0% -1.1% 1.7% -0.38 0.8%
MADAGASCAR -3.4% 4.9% 1.5% 1.9% -0.80 2.7%
MALAWI -4.3% 6.3% 2.0% 3.5% -0.52 2.2%
MALI -2.4% 7.9% 5.5% 4.8% -0.56 1.4%
MAURITANIA -1.4% 6.5% 5.1% 3.4% -1.57 2.2%
MOZAMBIQUE -6.7% 9.8% 3.1% 5.6% -0.52 3.5%
NIGER -0.9% 5.4% 4.5% 2.7% -0.56 0.5%
RWANDA -3.8% 5.7% 2.0% 1.8% -0.38 1.4%
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE -4.0% 3.8% -0.3% 1.2% -0.38 1.5%
SENEGAL -3.3% 3.7% 0.4% 3.0% -1.96 6.4%
TANZANIA -7.9% 11.9% 4.0% 3.8% -0.81 6.4%
UGANDA -3.6% 6.8% 3.2% 5.3% -1.04 3.8%
ZAMBIA -10.1% 10.5% 0.4% 0.3% -0.42 4.2%
Average (PPP weighted) -4.1% 6.5% 2.4% 3.3% -0.75 2.8%
II.   HIPCs (that reached enhanced DP by April 2004)
CHAD -0.3% 2.8% 2.5% 1.0% -0.38 0.1%
ETHIOPIA -8.8% 12.0% 3.1% 3.3% -0.67 5.9%
GHANA -6.7% 10.1% 3.4% 4.3% -2.40 16.0%
SIERRA LEONE -10.6% 7.2% -3.4% -1.4% -1.12 11.9%
Average (PPP weighted) -7.4% 10.3% 2.8% 3.3% -1.36 9.8%
III.    HIPCs (that have not yet reached enhanced DP)
BURUNDI -2.1% 4.5% 2.4% 1.8% -0.38 0.8%
COMOROS -0.2% 3.3% 3.1% 2.7% -0.94 0.2%
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF -1.7% 5.4% 3.7% 3.4% -0.38 0.6%
COTE D IVOIRE -5.6% 7.4% 1.8% 3.1% -1.79 10.1%
TOGO -0.7% 3.4% 2.7% 2.8% -1.12 0.8%
Average (PPP weighted) -4.0% 6.1% 2.2% 2.9% -1.37 6.5%
IV.    Other African countries
ALGERIA -8.1% 11.0% 2.9% 2.4% -1.57 12.7%
BOTSWANA -1.2% 8.4% 7.2% 7.2% -0.52 0.6%
CAPE VERDE -1.3% 3.9% 2.6% 2.1% -1.12 1.5%
EGYPT -3.8% 8.6% 4.9% 4.0% -1.57 5.9%
EQUATORIAL GUINEA -6.1% 16.5% 10.4% 14.0% -0.38 2.3%
GABON -0.7% 2.1% 1.5% 0.9% -0.38 0.2%
KENYA (sustainable HIPC) -2.6% 6.4% 3.7% 0.9% -1.40 3.7%
LESOTHO -0.9% 6.2% 5.3% 4.8% -0.52 0.5%
MAURITIUS -1.8% 10.7% 8.9% 8.8% -0.94 1.7%
MOROCCO -4.7% 8.7% 4.0% 3.4% -1.57 7.4%
NAMIBIA -0.6% 5.4% 4.7% 4.4% -0.52 0.3%
NIGERIA -10.4% 12.2% 1.8% -1.7% -1.16 12.0%
SEYCHELLES -1.9% 9.3% 7.4% 4.3% -0.94 1.8%
SOUTH AFRICA -1.8% 2.7% 0.9% 0.6% -0.52 0.9%
SWAZILAND -1.4% 8.1% 6.7% 7.2% -0.61 0.9%
TUNISIA -2.0% 5.5% 3.5% 3.5% -1.57 3.1%
ZIMBABWE -11.9% 15.1% 3.2% 0.5% -0.52 6.1%
Average (PPP weighted) -4.4% 7.1% 2.7% 1.8% -1.07 5.4%
14 Afr. Compl. Point HIPCs (PPP w.) -5.6% 8.8% 3.3% 3.8% -1.08 5.9%
All African HIPCs (PPP w.) -5.0% 7.5% 2.5% 3.2% -1.00 5.3%
Africa (PPP weighted) -4.5% 7.2% 2.6% 2.1% -1.06 5.4%
Table 2: The Effect of Debt Service on Real GDP Growth and Poverty in Africa 
(per annum, 1985-1999 averages)
*/
Note */: Angola, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Eritrea, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, 
and Sudan are excluded due to lack of data. of these nine excluded countries, the DRC reached the enhanced decision point in July 2003; 
Angola, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Libya are considered sustainable without requiring HIPC debt relief; the CAR, Liberia, Somalia, and the Sudan 
remain to be considered under the HIPC Initiative.  16 
 
 
IV.2.  Impact of 100 Percent Debt Relief 
By reversing the sign of the values in the first and last column of Table 2, Table 2 
can also be interpreted as providing the benefits each country would get from 100 percent 
debt relief, as with 100 percent debt relief, debt service would be zero, and thus, the 
effects of debt service would also be zero. Obviously, this exercise should be applied 
mainly to HIPCs, and especially to those that have reached the enhanced completion 
point, as the proposed 100 percent debt relief kicks only in once a country has reached 
the enhanced completion point. Taking the weighted average of the 14 African HIPCs 
that  have  reached  the  enhanced  completion  point  by  end-May  2005,  our  calculations 
(shown in the bottom of Table 2) show that—other things being equal—real GDP growth 
is estimated to increase in the average by 5.6 percent per year due to 100 percent debt 
relief, while poverty would decrease by 5.9 percent per year.  
 
IV.3.  Impact of HIPC Debt Relief on Growth and Poverty 
We now move to look at the results displayed in Tables 3 to 5. Table 3 provides 
the effects of debt service on growth (first three columns) and on poverty (last three 
columns). Columns 1 and 4 show the effects before the HIPC Initiative. Columns 2 and 5 
show the effects after HIPC debt relief. The third and the six columns show, respectively, 
the net increase in real GDP growth and the net reduction in poverty, both due to HIPC 
debt relief. The last row of the third column shows that on average (for the 18 HIPCs), 
HIPC debt relief has contributed to real GDP growth by 2.9 percent per year. Though 
there are some variations across countries, there is always a net increase in real GDP 
growth due to HIPC debt relief, varying between a minimal 0.8 percent (for the Gambia) 
to a maximal 6.0 percent (for Tanzania). The other two countries in which the HIPC 
Initiative had a large impact on real GDP growth are Guinea and Zambia. A considerable 
part  of  these  differences  are  attributable  to  qualitative  differences  and  differences  in 
institutions across countries, i.e., how effective a country has made use of HIPC debt 
relief. 
 
Looking at the impact of the HIPC debt relief on poverty reduction (the last three 
columns of Table 3), it is once again the case that all countries display a positive net 
impact, ranging between a high 5.1 percent annual reduction in poverty (for Senegal) to a 
low 0.3 percent annual reduction in poverty for Niger. Given the differences in poverty 
elasticities across countries, it is only normal that the countries that benefited most from 
the HIPC debt relief in terms of real GDP growth are not necessarily the countries that 
benefited most in terms of poverty reduction. However, it is still the case that the three 
countries with the highest impact on real GDP growth have also experienced a more than 
average reduction in poverty. The three countries that benefited most from HIPC debt 
relief in terms of poverty reduction are Senegal (5.1 percent per annum), Tanzania (4.9 
percent  per  annum),  and  Uganda  (3.1  percent  per  annum).  The  four  countries  that 
benefited the least in terms of poverty from HIPC debt relief are Cameroon, the Gambia, 
Niger, and Sao Tome & Principe (with an effect below 0.5 percent per year for each of 
these four countries). 





IV.4.  Impact of Changes in the ToT on Growth and Poverty 
Similar to Table 3, Table 4 shows the impact of changes in the ToT on growth 
and poverty. We have kept the format between Tables 3 and 4 identical to make it easier 
to read the results. Hence, as was the case in Table 3, a positive value in the first three 
columns implies a positive impact on real GDP growth, and a negative number in the last 
three columns indicate an increase in poverty. Given that some HIPCs experienced an 
improvement  in  the  ToT  while  others  experienced  a  deterioration,  Table  4  displays 
positive as well as negative numbers in every column.  
 
The values of the first column, which reflect the ToT effect on real GDP growth 
during 1985-99, range between a minimal -0.38 percent (for Zambia) to a maximal 6.16 
percent (for Guinea-Bissau), with an average of 1.9 percent. The positive average for 
1985-99 implies that the average country benefited from ToT changes during 1985-99. 
For the second column, which reflects the ToT effect on real GDP growth during 2001-
03, the values range between a low -4.7 percent (Guinea-Bissau) to a high 0.5 percent 
(Mauritania),  whereby  the  average  amounts  to  a  negative  0.1  percent,  reflecting  an 
overall  detrimental  impact  of  the  ToT  effect  during  2001-03.  Taking  the  difference 
between  the  first  two  columns  reflects  the  net  increase  in  real  GDP  growth  due  to 
changes in the ToT during 2001-03, which is overall clearly negative, hence, the average 
HIPC  lost  considerably  due  to  recent  ToT  movements.  Only  four  countries  (Benin, 
Madagascar, Senegal, and Zambia) display marginally positive percentages, indicating 
that these four countries have experienced a small net increase in real GDP growth due to 
recent ToT movements (2001-03).  
 
Before the HIPC 
Initiative (1985-99)
After the HIPC 
Initiative (2001-03)
Before the HIPC 
Initiative (1985-99)
After the HIPC 
Initiative (2001-03)
BENIN -1.3% -0.4% 0.9% 1.4% 0.5% 1.0%
BURKINA FASO -1.9% -0.9% 1.0% 1.3% 0.6% 0.7%
CAMEROON -1.6% -0.4% 1.1% 0.6% 0.2% 0.4%
GAMBIA, THE -0.8% -0.4% 0.4% 0.7% 0.4% 0.4%
GUINEA -7.1% -1.6% 5.5% 2.7% 0.6% 2.1%
GUINEA-BISSAU -2.1% -0.7% 1.4% 0.8% 0.3% 0.5%
MADAGASCAR -3.4% -0.6% 2.8% 2.7% 0.5% 2.2%
MALAWI -4.3% -2.3% 2.1% 2.2% 1.2% 1.1%
MALI -2.4% -0.8% 1.6% 1.4% 0.4% 0.9%
MAURITANIA -1.4% -0.6% 0.8% 2.2% 0.9% 1.3%
MOZAMBIQUE -6.7% -2.2% 4.5% 3.5% 1.1% 2.3%
NIGER -0.9% -0.3% 0.6% 0.5% 0.2% 0.3%
RWANDA -3.8% -2.1% 1.7% 1.4% 0.8% 0.7%
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE -4.0% -3.1% 1.0% 1.5% 1.2% 0.4%
SENEGAL -3.3% -0.7% 2.6% 6.4% 1.3% 5.1%
TANZANIA -7.9% -1.9% 6.0% 6.4% 1.5% 4.9%
UGANDA -3.6% -0.7% 3.0% 3.8% 0.7% 3.1%
ZAMBIA -10.1% -4.2% 5.9% 4.2% 1.8% 2.5%
Average (PPP weighted) -4.1% -1.2% 2.9% 2.8% 0.8% 2.2%
Table 3: Net Increase in Real GDP Growth and Net Reduction in Poverty due to the HIPC 
Initiative in Africa (2001-03 averages)
Effect of Debt Service on Growth
Net Reduction 
in Poverty due 
to the HIPC 
Initiative
Net Increase 
in Real GDP 
Growth due 
to the HIPC 
Initiative
Effect of Debt Service on Poverty




The impact of the ToT on poverty, displayed in the last three columns of Table 4, 
are once again consistent with the impact of the ToT on real GDP growth. For example, 
all countries experiencing a net decrease in real GDP growth rates also experienced a net 
increase in poverty, though there are differences in relative sizes at the country level, 
reflecting differences in the poverty elasticity across countries. At the average, poverty 
has  increased  by  1.3  percent  per  year  due  to  recent  changes  in  the  ToT.  The  three 
countries in which poverty increased the most due to recent ToT changes are the Gambia 
(3.5  percent),  Guinea-Bissau  (4.1  percent),  and  Tanzania  (4.0  percent).  The  three 
countries at which recent ToT changes had close to zero net effect on poverty reduction 
are Benin, Madagascar, and Zambia. None of the 18 HIPCs experienced any significant 
positive impact on poverty reduction due to recent ToT changes. 
 
IV.5.  Comparison of Net Effects 
Finally, Table 5 provides a comparison of the net effects of HIPC debt relief with 
the net effects of changes in the ToT. Like before, the first three columns refer to the net 
effects on real GDP growth and the last three columns refer to the net effects on poverty 
reduction. The interpretation of the first, second, fourth, and fifth columns of Table 5 is 
however different than in same columns of Tables 3 and 4, as all columns in Table 5 are 
net effects. Column three of Table 5 is then simply the sum of the first two columns, 
while column six is simply the sum of the fourth and fifth column. Given that the details 
of columns one, two, four and five have already been discussed above, we can limit our 
observations to the averages and the new columns. 
 
1985-99 2001-03 1985-99 2001-03
BENIN 0.00% 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.0%
BURKINA FASO 0.87% -0.10% -1.0% -0.60% 0.07% -0.7%
CAMEROON 2.65% 0.46% -2.2% -1.01% -0.18% -0.8%
GAMBIA, THE 3.31% -0.62% -3.9% -2.92% 0.55% -3.5%
GUINEA 4.24% -0.42% -4.7% -1.61% 0.16% -1.8%
GUINEA-BISSAU 6.16% -4.73% -10.9% -2.34% 1.80% -4.1%
MADAGASCAR -0.06% -0.02% 0.0% 0.05% 0.01% 0.0%
MALAWI 1.01% -0.13% -1.1% -0.52% 0.07% -0.6%
MALI 1.89% -0.10% -2.0% -1.06% 0.06% -1.1%
MAURITANIA 2.49% 0.49% -2.0% -3.91% -0.76% -3.1%
MOZAMBIQUE 1.08% 0.13% -1.0% -0.56% -0.07% -0.5%
NIGER 2.80% 0.14% -2.7% -1.57% -0.08% -1.5%
RWANDA 0.84% -0.20% -1.0% -0.32% 0.08% -0.4%
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 1.07% -0.30% -1.4% -0.41% 0.11% -0.5%
SENEGAL -0.24% -0.01% 0.2% 0.47% 0.02% 0.4%
TANZANIA 4.84% -0.05% -4.9% -3.92% 0.04% -4.0%
UGANDA 1.60% -0.80% -2.4% -1.66% 0.83% -2.5%
ZAMBIA -0.38% -0.02% 0.4% 0.16% 0.01% 0.1%
Average (PPP weighted) 1.9% -0.1% -2.0% -1.2% 0.1% -1.3%
Table 4: Net Increase in Real GDP Growth and Net Reduction in Poverty due to Changes 
in the Terms of Trade in African HIPCs (2001-03 averages)
Effects of Changes in the Terms of 
Trade on Growth
Net Increase 
in Real GDP 









to Changes in 
Terms of 




Comparing  the  averages  of  the  first  three  columns,  one  key  result  is  that  66 
percent of the benefits from HIPC debt relief (provided during 2001-03) have been lost 
due to changes in ToT experienced during the same period, as the positive net effect of 
2.7 percent in the first column is followed by a negative 1.8 percent, resulting in a net 
effect from both changes (debt relief and ToT changes) of 0.9 percent. With regards to 
the average net effect from both changes on poverty, poverty has been reduced by an 
average of 2.2 percent a year due to HIPC debt relief, while poverty has increased by 1.3 
percent a year due to ToT shocks, leaving just 0.9 percent of poverty reduction as the net 
effect from HIPC debt relief and changes in the ToT. Hence, this implies that 60 percent 
of the benefits from HIPC debt relief on poverty reduction have been lost due to changes 
in ToT. Looking at some country details, six countries (Cameroon, the Gambia, Guinea-
Bissau,  Mali,  Mauritania,  Niger,  and  Sao  Tome  &  Principe)  have  a  negative  overall 
effect, on both, real GDP growth and poverty reduction. For seven countries (Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Guinea, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda) the overall effect on 
growth, as well as the overall effect on poverty, has been between 0 and 1 percent. For 
only four HIPCs (Madagascar, Mozambique, Senegal, and Zambia) have the overall net 
effects on growth and on poverty reduction been significant.  
 
Yet, we should be careful with interpreting these results and calculations for at 
least three reasons. First, it needs to be stressed that these are net effects. It is likely, that 
debt relief has other macroeconomic effects, which are not captured by these results. For 
example, there are some indications that the removal of the debt overhang has some 
positive  implications  on  private  capital  flows,  which  would  then  be  captured  by  the 
capital flows effect of our growth equation. Yet, there are obviously many other factors 
of HIPC 
Debt Relief
of Changes in 
the Terms of 
Trade
of both HIPC Debt 
Relief and 




of Changes in 
the Terms of 
Trade
of both HIPC Debt 
Relief and 
Changes in the 
ToT
BENIN 0.9% 0.0% 0.9% 1.0% 0.0% 1.0%
BURKINA FASO 1.0% -1.0% 0.0% 0.7% -0.7% 0.0%
CAMEROON 1.1% -2.2% -1.0% 0.4% -0.8% -0.4%
GAMBIA, THE 0.4% -3.9% -3.5% 0.4% -3.5% -3.1%
GUINEA 5.5% -4.7% 0.8% 2.1% -1.8% 0.3%
GUINEA-BISSAU 1.4% -10.9% -9.4% 0.5% -4.1% -3.6%
MADAGASCAR 2.8% 0.0% 2.9% 2.2% 0.0% 2.3%
MALAWI 2.1% -1.1% 0.9% 1.1% -0.6% 0.5%
MALI 1.6% -2.0% -0.3% 0.9% -1.1% -0.2%
MAURITANIA 0.8% -2.0% -1.2% 1.3% -3.1% -1.8%
MOZAMBIQUE 4.5% -1.0% 3.6% 2.3% -0.5% 1.8%
NIGER 0.6% -2.7% -2.1% 0.3% -1.5% -1.2%
RWANDA 1.7% -1.0% 0.7% 0.7% -0.4% 0.3%
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 1.0% -1.4% -0.4% 0.4% -0.5% -0.2%
SENEGAL 2.6% 0.2% 2.9% 5.1% 0.4% 5.6%
TANZANIA 6.0% -4.9% 1.1% 4.9% -4.0% 0.9%
UGANDA 3.0% -2.4% 0.6% 3.1% -2.5% 0.6%
ZAMBIA 5.9% 0.4% 6.2% 2.5% 0.1% 2.6%
Average (PPP weighted) 2.7% -1.8% 0.9% 2.2% -1.3% 0.9%
Country Name
Table 5: Comparison of Net Effects of HIPC Debt Relief with Net Effects of Changes in the 
Terms of Trade on Growth and Poverty Reduction (2001-03 averages)
Net Effects on Real GDP Growth Net Effects on Poverty Reduction  20 
 
 
that  affect  capital  flows.  A  second  reason  why  we  have  to  be  careful  with  the 
interpretation of our results is that the debt service savings may be used for poverty-
reducing expenditures that we are not able to capture with a macroeconomic model.
13 
Third, while the true impact of debt relief may be higher than the net effects presented 
above, it is also likely that HIPCs experiencing serious deteriorations in their ToT may be 
supported by the international community, like for example, increased aid flows. On the 
other hand, it could also be argued that ToT deteriorations may have negative effects that 
go beyond macroeconomic effects. Much of these are however beyond the scope of this 
paper. Given the limitations of any macroeconomic model, the above results are quite 
reasonable.  
 
Chapter V: Policy Implications and Conclusions 
 
One set of policy implications, which stems from our results that debt relief has a 
positive impact on growth and poverty reduction, is to enhance debt relief. The newly 
reached  agreement  to  provide  100  percent  debt  relief  is  therefore  crucial  for  HIPCs 
currently in the interim period to speed up efforts to reach the enhanced completion point. 
Similarly, more efforts need to be undertaken by HIPCs that have not yet reached their 
decision point. And finally, looking at the relative high negative effect debt service has 
on some of the non-HIPCs, it might also be worthwhile to consider alternatives to extend 
debt service to some non-HIPCs. Yet, we also need to keep in mind that even 100 percent 
debt relief will not be sufficient to reach the MDGs in most African countries.  
 
Another set of policy implications stem from the negative impact terms of trade 
shocks.  Calls  for  increased  international  efforts  to  limit  the  negative  impact  of  ToT 
shocks are no novelty. As already referred to above, the analysis and policy suggestions 
of the International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management (2002) are critical and 
deserve  more  attention.  Yet,  many  of  these  suggestions  are  related  to  treating  the 
symptoms instead of treating the underlying sources for the high vulnerability HIPCs 
continue to face.  
 
The long-term agenda to achieve sustainable growth and poverty reduction needs 
to  focus  much  more  on  a  long-term  development  strategy  that  fosters  the  necessary 
structural transformation of HIPCs. It is unlikely that HIPCs will undergo the necessary 
structural transformation without targeted policy interventions. As is detailed in Hussain 
(1998,  1999,  and  2005),  this  calls  for  a  combination  of  industrial  investments  that 
concentrate on certain export niches, supporting competition policies, and strategic trade 
policies that go beyond the existing (though under-exploited) comparative advantages in 
agriculture.  An  appropriate  mix  of  such  policies  could  lead  to  the  development  of 
selected industrial bases and service centers that can—at least in the long-term—compete 
in the global international market and generate additional foreign exchange to finance the 
imports required for sustaining higher growth rates.   
                                                 
13 Some of these effects depend on trickle-down effects from growth to poverty through the poverty 
elasticity of growth. It might also be argued that the effect of HIPC debt relief due to increased education 
and health expenditures might accrue in the longer-run and that the poverty elasticities based on past 
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